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CHAPTER 6
THE MARKET FOR LOYALTIES AND THE
USES OF COMPARATIVE MEDIA LAW
Monroe E. Price
We have seen in the previous chapter the use of foreign mod
els and comparative media law in several areas important to the
drafting of the Indian Broadcasting Bill. These included the licens
ing of satellite broadcasting services, the licensing of DTH provid
ers, requiring in-country uplinking, the level of foreign equity
required for certain kinds of providers, and cross-media owhership
restrictions. We also observed certain methodological problems in
volved in conducting comparative studies and in gathering, inter
preting, and presenting data.
This chapter provides a theoretical perspective on the use of
media law models in such a compju-ative effort. We pursue the
question posed in the introduction: is media law so country spe
cific, so tied to the mores, history, political structure, regulatory
style, and state of the creative industry in a particular place that
influences from other contexts are only marginally helpful? Or, on
the contrary, is media law, especially in international societies, so
much a part of an increasingly transnational whole that any at
tempt at identifying sharp local differences, unique in style and
outcome, is virtually doomed?
I. THE MARKET FOR LOYALTIES
I have attempted to develop an explanatory approach for
many examples of media legislation in my book. Television: the
Public Sphere and National Identity.^ I made the general and ex
pansive claim that all broadcast regulation is an effort within a soci
ety to maintain or adjust a cartel, and not just a cartel of
businesses, but one involving the dominant mix of political views
and cultural attitudes. I posited that, while such legislation was
often justified in terms of preserving or strengthening national
identity, national identity was, at bottom, the set of political views
1 MONROE E. PRICE, TELEVISION: THE PUBUC SPHERE AND NATIONAL IDENTITY

(1995).

445

446

CARDOZO J. OF INT'L & COMP. LAW

[Vol. 5:445

and cultural attitudes which could maintain the existing power
structure. I suggested that, while there were several ways to define
"national identity," including a discovery of the "true" or "his
toric" national identity of a state, this slightly cynical definition
(one defined by the power structure so as to maintain its power)
enhances our understanding of media legislation from a compara
tive approach.
If this is true, if broadcast regulation can be seen in this light,
then the project of broadcast reform, such as the current reform
undertaken in India, takes on new meaning. Broadcast reform
would be necessary in a state either if: (1) the existing set of broad
casting laws is inadequate at performing the cartelization function;
or (2) the "national identity" has changed or is changing and legis
lation is necessary to legitimate the new players and, in turn, to
protect them against unregulated challenge. A variation on the
second premise posits: sharp challenges to the status quo can only
be absorbed by opening the system to new players or, put differ
ently, it is only by discussing the possibility of broadcast reform
and the hope of expanded entry that the existing cartel can main
tain its dominant regulatory position.^
In the Indian context, the issue of cartelization has always
loomed large. The Broadcasting Bill, after all, is partly about legit
imating, for the first time, competitive private terrestrial broadcast
ers who might challenge the relative Doordarshan monopoly. The
Indian debate, as well, has concerned the very structure of Door
darshan and its relationship to the Government. While this is not
an issue in the draft Broadcasting Bill, it is very much part of the
reform agenda as indicated by the decision of the Government to
implement the Prasar Bharati Act, thus providing more autonomy
to Doordarshan.

2 In developing a framework for comparative analysis of European media policy mak
ing, Karen Siune, et al., defined policy making as "a reaction to a challenge, a reaction that
is intended to find a reasonable balance between 'forces of change' and 'forces of preserva
tion'." They also stated that "[i]n the current process of adaptation to technological pro
gress public action strategies in most European countries may seem to be a reaction to the
risk of disintegration, especially in cultural matters, in the broadest sense." This logic can
also be noticed at the Indian level and underlines partly the concept of the market for
loyalties. NEW MEDIA POLITICS: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES IN WESTERN EUROPE ch. 2
(Dennis McQuail & Karen Siune eds., 1986).
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A. Examples of the Market for Loyalties
Before turning further to India, some examples of media stat
utes reflecting national identity in this cartelized sense may be use
ful. In Italy, the very architecture of public service broadcasting m
the early 1990s reveals a conscious design to accommodate the sys
tem of political parties, with Christian Democrats controlling the
first channel. Socialists the second, and the former Communist
PADS the third.^ In Germany, by constitution and statute, regula
tion is purposefully inclusive: public broadcasting corporations are
obliged to adhere to a rule of internal pluralism, enforced by a gov
erning board, the Rundfunkrat, in which the opinions, values, inter
ests, and perspectives in the society must be rigorously
represented.^ The statutory ideal is for broadcasting to mirror soci
ety's composition, but the consequence has been a rough parceling
out of licenses among dominant political parties. Specific state
broadcasting agencies which supervise the private license holders
must assure the realization of the goal that the entirety of the three
program channels is pluralistic, i.e., the total of them articulate the
plurality of opinions and voice the views of the relevant political,
ideological, and social forces and groups of civil society.^ The same
is true in Belgium, which has a complex broadcasting system due to
its different internal cultural and broadcasting policies. The mem
bers of the governing body of the public service broadcasters are
appointed by Parliament, and its composition reflects the power of
the different so-called political pillars (Catholics, Socialists and
Liberals). Moreover, in an effort to maintain the so-called cultural
pact" which reflects the "national identity," internal job promo
tions have not been awarded according to qualifications, but for
party loyalty.®
3 For a recent account of the crumbling of this architecture, see Robert Graham FM
Rules the Airwaves: How Berlusconi Won Control of Broadcasting, FIN. TIMES (London),
July 2,1994, at 4, available in LEXIS, World Library, Arcnws File; sec also Don Sassoon,
Italy: The Advent of Private Broadcasting, in THE POLITICS OF BROADCASTING 119 ( ay-

mond Kuhn ed., 1985).

See generally VINCENT PORTER & SUZANNE HASSELBACH, PLURALISM, PO
AND THE MARKETPLACE: THE REGULATION OF GERMAN BROADCASTING (1991).

5 Under an inter-Lander treaty entered into in 1991, the existence of external plural
ism is presumed if each of three program channels produced in Germany by three different
private broadcasting corporations and broadcast nationwide can be received by more than
half the population in Germany. Id.
6 For a detailed analysis, see JEAN-CLAUDE BURGELMAN, OMROEP EN POLITIEK. HET
BELGISCH AUDIOVISUEEL OMROEPBESTEL ALS INZET EN RESULTANTE VAN PARTIJPOLITIEKE MACHTSTRATEGIEEN (1990).

448

CARDOZO J. OF INT'L & COMF. LAW

[Vol. 5:445

lUrkey provides another dramatic example of the effort to
maintain control over competition in the market of loyalties, here
explicitly in the name of national identity. Since the rise of Kemal
Ataturk, the Turkish Government — at least until the middle of
the 1990s when realignment occurred — considered what has been
called Islamic fundamentalism a threat to the secular state. Advo
cates of secularism, and certainly those in control of the state prior
to the mid-1990s, sought to limit the use of the mass media to their
religious competitors. The Turkish Radio and Television Authority
("TRT") was not only monopolistic, but was in essence the voice of
the State, disseminating the unitary ideology and culture of TUrkish
republicanism; it found itself highly susceptible to government in
tervention.^ Charged by statute with "promoting the values of
country, unity, republic, public order, harmony, and welfare and to
strengthen the principles of Kemal Ataturk's reforms[,]"® TRT has
been an instrument for eohesiveness in an environment riven by
alternate national identities. When TRT was attacked for broad
casting programs that legitimated Islamic fundamentalism, a doc
trine considered hostile to the secular state, the Agency's DirectorGeneral was forced by the Government to resign.®
The structure of broadcasting is also related to current views
concerning federalism and relative autonomy. In Europe, where
there is an effort to build what Michael Keating has called stateless
nations, like Catalonia and Scotland,^" broadcasting policy will,
over time, reflect internal political adjustments. Systems that have
been tightly controlled from the center, in terms of access of
images to populations or subsidization of messages of political
^ See Asu Aksoy & Kevin Robins, Gecekondu-Style Broadcasting in Turkey: A Con
frontation of Cultural Values, INTERMEDIA, June-July 1993, at 15; see also Haluk Sahin &
Asu Aksoy, Global Media and Cultural Identity in Turkey, 43 J. COMM. 31 (1992).
® ELI NOAM, TELEVISION IN EUROPE 258 (1991).

^ See id.

At the time of writing, a referendum on devolution in Scotland was scheduled to
take place. It was, however, expected that devolution, if it happens, would affect broad
casting in a number of ways.
All channels will experience change; the BBC will be under pressure to supply
far more Scottish originated programmes, Scotland's ITV companies will be
looking to claw back even more sovereignty over their air time and Channels 4
and 5 will need to improve their Scottish production and extend the diversity of
representations of Scotland on screen.
Jane-Ann Purdy, Assembly to Change Channels, SCOTSMAN, May 16,1997, at 29, available
in LEXIS, World Library, Curnws File. All this will be heavily influenced by the machina
tions of the new Assembly. See id.
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unity, will give way to more decentralized methods of deciding
both.
B. The Market for Loyalties and External Voices
These examples address the use of law to preserve, adjust, or
expand a cartel of loyalties internally and render some division of
that internal market. In the world of "globalization," a major chal
lenge to any existing cartel can be deemed to come from abroad.
Indeed, the possibility of such a threat can be used, and certainly
has historically been used, as a device to build internal support for
the existing power structure. In the world of easy data and infor
mation transmission, the external threat can be deemed cultural,
not military, and ideological, not solely based on force in the tradi
tional sense." Here, again, the use of a cultural threat is not a new
one, but it becomes, somehow, universalized. The Indian Broad
casting Bill, at least those parts that restrict entry by foreign com
petitors, can be read as an example of the use of cultural threat to
justify protection of the existing cartel.
While law has been used in the past to protect internal produ
cers of national identity from external competition, the effective
ness of law to accomplish so protective an umbrella is now under
question. For most of the century, the international order assumed
that radio transmissions should be contained primarily within the
boundaries of one nation; the international function was to dis
pense frequencies so as to assure that these conditions of market
division were met and enforced.^^ Over the twentieth century, in
ternational regulations and arrangements were built to reinforce
the national impulse, to limit broadcasting to indigenous, highquality transmissions of good quality within the frontiers of the
11 The use of a foreign treaty is, of course, a well-known military and political strategy
countries are using to create internal coherence or to redeem the authority of unpopular
governments, as first described by the Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz. In
the days of the Falklands War, Margaret Thatcher could, for instance, whip up a degree of
popular support by waving the flag for "our Boys." See BRUCE D. PORTER, WAR AND THE
RISE OF THE STATE: THE MILITARY FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN POLITICS (1994); JOHN
KEEQAN, A HISTORY OF WARFARE (1993).

12 One of R.H. Coase's early economic analyses of law showed how regulation in Brit
ain was used to limit competition from radio signals originating in France and Luxem
bourg. R.H. CoASE, BRITISH BROADCASTING: A STUDY IN MONOPOLY (1950). What
became the BBC emerged, in part, as a legal expression of fear that unregulated transborder data flow might injure British nationhood.
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country concerned.^^ In the interludes between great wars, there
were bilateral and multilateral agreements to control propaganda
subversive to the state system. For example, the League of Na
tions-sponsored Convention Concerning the Use of Broadcasting
in the Cause of Peace provided:
The High Contracting Parties mutually undertake to prohibit
and, if occasion arises, to stop without delay the broadcasting
within their respective territories of any transmission which to
the determinant of good intemational understanding is of such a
character as to incite the population of any territory to acts in
compatible with the intemal order or the security of a territory
of a High Contracting Party.^"*
The 1989 European Broadcast Directive illustrates the evolution in
Europe from the longstanding approach of exclusion based on na
tional borders to a common union within the community of mem
bers based on encouraging free competition for identity while also
seeking to regulate competition, even if mildly from outside the
community.^^ In the 1994 GATT negotiations,^^ the EU reserved
See President Pushes TV Marti; ITU Pushes Back, BROADCASTING, Apr. 9, 1990, at
37 (discussing message from International Frequency Registration Board, an arm of the

International Telecommunication Union, to the State Department concerning the legality
of TV Marti, the American initiative to bring its television to Cuba); see also Steven Ruth,
Comment, The Regulation of Spillover Transmissions from Direct Broadcast Satellites in
Europe, 42 FED. COMM. L.J. 107 (1989).

I'* International Convention Concerning the Use of Broadcasting in the Cause of
Peace, Sept. 23, 1936, art. I, 186 L.N.T.S. 301, 309. Similarly, in the Litvinov Agreement
the US and the U.S.S.R. both promised not to spread propaganda hostile to the other and
not to harbor groups working toward the overthrow of the other. Exchange of Communi
cations Between the President of the United States and Maxim M. Litvinov People's Com
missar for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, reprinted in 28 AM. J.
INT'L L. 2 (Supp. 1934).
See generally THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF COMMUNICATIONS: INTERNATIONAL
AND EUROPEAN DIMENSIONS (Kenneth Dyson & Peter Humphreys eds., 1990).

1® The quota measure was especially (e.g., 50% European works) controversial. Imme
diately after the Broadcasting Directive was formally adopted, the US objected that some
parts of the measure were contrary to GATT. Shortly thereafter, US officials filed a trade
complaint with GATT to protest the Directive's quota clause as an "unfair trade practice."
Responding to the US complaint, the EC argued that the Directive did not come within the
scope of GATT since, first, GATT rules did not apply to services and, second, the quota
principle was intended to protect cultural sovereignty and, thus, could well be exempt from
the usual GATT restrictions. See Kelly L. Wilkins, Recent Development, Television With
out Frontiers: An EEC Broadcasting Premiere, 14 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 195, 206-07
(1991).
Other issues discussed at the 1994 Uruguay Round (GATT), matters in which the US
regarded the EU as behaving in a discriminatory fashion, were subsidies for the sector and
the blank tapes levy. At the last moment, the audiovisual sector was removed from GATT
at the request of, and thus a "victory" for, France and the European audiovisual sector.
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film and television programming from the general lowering of
trade barriers on the ground that a European cultural space ought
to be preserved, strengthened, and protected from the supposed
Hollywood influx. And Canada, on the one hand, and Malaysia on
the other, are countries with very different traditions that seek to
deploy law, or law in conjunction with the structure of the industry,
in an effort to control the relationship between images from abroad
and imagery from within. Canada does so in a context in which
there is already a rather open society; Malaysia does so in a context
in which televised images from abroad traditionally have been
tightly controlled.
Considering all of this together, the old ideal — conformity of
signal transmission to national borders — has changed in the pe
riod of ascending globalism. The excitement, the association with
freedom, the attraction to capital lie with the transnational, the ac
cumulation of audience and markets. "Space" (the idea of the unregulable, open skies), both in terms of the locus for transmission
and the absence of authority, is said to be replacing "place" (in the
sense of the national and the regulable). In the 1970s, the United
Nations discussed principles which would not only bar certain
kinds of programs from direct broadcast satellites,^^ but would re
quire consultations with governments whose audiences were
targeted and, in some exemplars, require national consent for di
rect broadcast signals that were specifically directed from one state
to the territory of another. Opposition to radio pirates was ap
plauded. Twenty years later, though, that is now altered. The ef
forts of countries to control their information space is questioned
in terms of emerging international norms.
The task is to understand which measures, administered in
what way, represent an acceptable bridge between concepts of
space and concepts of place. To take an example, prohibitions, or
restrictive and prohibitive licensing of the ownership of satellite
dishes, can be viewed as too rigid an interference with the right to
receive information, especially if it is related to a general effort to
The EU was not obliged to apply Most Favored Nation status nor to increase market ac
cess, and the US was free to retaliate.
17 Such broadcasts included "material publicizing ideas of war, militarism, nazism, na
tional and racial hatred and enmity between peoples, as well as material which is immoral
or instigative in nature or is otherwise aimed at interfering in the domestic affairs or for
eign policy of other States." Preparation of an International Convention on Principles Gov
erning the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for Direct Television Broadcasting,

U.N. GAOR, 27th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 37, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/8771 (1972).
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foreclose a diversity of sources of information. In some countries,
law sometimes takes the place of force in achieving a desired cen
sorious result.
C. Advertising in the Market for Loyalties
Regulation of advertising can be used as an example to show
how this process of controlling information, or using law, operates.
In a market for loyalties, advocates for disparate national identities
will predictably have different attitudes toward the use of ordinary
commercial advertising on television and the kind of Western pro
gramming that ordinarily accompanies it.^® The preoccupation that
governments have long had with limiting advertising messages and
excluding competition from commercial broadcasters suggests that
the impact of programming on public allegiances yields a substitute
for more traditional packages of identity. Advertising can per
suade individuals to consume rather than to save and invest, with
consequences for particular visions of the public good. In this
sense, marketers of pure national identities, and ideologies that
parade as such, compete with sellers of consumer goods who are
trying to impress the citizen with another identity. Here the ques
tion is how a person, certainly one in a developed society, decides,
at the margin, whether a higher or lower percentage of disposable
income should go to the state (in taxes), say, for education or envi
ronmental protection (to be generous), or, instead, for personal
goods like food or television sets or automobiles.^^ In a society of
poverty, or where there are passionate masses reflecting on how
their lives should be led, the impact may not be measurable in
money alone, but in a purer form of sheer human loyalty.
The effect of advertising and of modem Western-style pro
gramming in the market for loyalties may also support certain
groups. Proponents of some identities recognize the indirect, sup
porting role that the barrage of traditional commercials, for every
thing from orange juice to computers, might play in connection
with their own narrations of future happiness. Parties advocating a
more rapid transition to a marketplace economy in states ambiFor an understanding of these issues, see STEVEN H. SmFFRns, THE FIRST AMEND
MENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE (1990).

19 The notion of elasticity of demand comes into play here. Sellers of ordinary goods
often want to know whether — and how much — an increase in price will decrease de
mand for their product. Manufacturers of national identities, including the state itself,
must (in the economic model) ask the same question.
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tious to increase their gross national product may see the political
benefits of a citizenry exposed to the culture of advertising and
consumerism as containing indirect or secondary messages of polit
ical significance. That is, apparently, a sufficient explanation for
the actions of the Narasimha Rao Government in the early 1990s,
as explained in Professor Sinha's chapter in this volume.
We see assertions of national identity in the interstices of com
mercials, in their depiction of idealized home life, opportunities to
travel, or a certain idea of traditional family values.^" Arguably,
one message of the sellers of toothpaste and automobiles is the
claim that the opportunity to have maximum choice to consume is
good. Those who fashion legislation may temper advertising by re
stricting television, restricting the content of advertising, or confin
ing it to certain channels or times. All these steps may reflect —
though not always — a perceived relationship between advertis
ing's impact and the nature of the political system.
If the images of consumer society are supportive of the party
in power, then that can be ground enough for their advocacy of an
increase in advertiser-supported broadcasting. Alternatively, a rul
ing coalition may see the images of advertising and the narratives
of foreign programs as a threat to its continued hold on govern
ment.^^ These often-foreign images are then characterized as sub
versive.^^ It is as if, though this may not always be the case, they
advocate by the basic aspects of their story lines a view of the indi
vidual that is wholly at odds with the reigning perspective.^^ These
dominant forces fear that the successful penetration of the world
view contained in Western advertising might yield a claim for polit
ical change.^ The most avid proponents of free market television
20 See CECELIA TICHI, ELECTRONIC HEARTH: CREATING AN AMERICAN TELEVISION
CULTURE (1991).
21 See MARIKA NATASHA TAISHOFF, STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND THE DIRECT BROAD
CAST SATELLITE 13 (1987).

22 Hiese images are usually labeled "American" for convenience, though they may
originate from many sources and from companies that are not controlled by US citizens.
23 Certainly, in the Islamic world, this is the view of the influence of Western television.
24 Zhao Shuifu argued that international satellite dissemination conducted by Western
developed counties threatens the independence and identity of China's national culture,
which includes loving the motherland, hard work, advocating industry and thrift, taking a
keen interest in science, attaching importance to culture, and stressing national courage.
Precisely because of this, according to Shuifu, the infringement of overseas radio and tele
vision and the influence they bring hampers the expansion of national spirit. Zhao Shuifu,
Foreign Dominance of Chinese Broadcasting — Will Hearts and Minds Follow?, IN
TERMEDIA, Apr.-May 1994, at 8.
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have, consistent with this position, argued that the images of West
ern society, including its advertising, are entitled to some of the
credit for the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet
Union.2^ -pjie point here, of course, is not the truth of the claims
about the impact of messages, but the perception of that impact
and the rhetorical use of it in rendering markets more open or
closed.
Constitutional rules like article 19 in India, the First Amend
ment in the US, the Television Without Frontiers Directives, and
other international human rights conventions like the European
Convention play a special role in limiting the cartelization of the
market for loyalties. These provisions — constitutional, treaty, or
basic laws — are essentially curbs on the power of a local political
cartel to use law and regulation to screen out voices that seek to
alter the current power structure and especially those that seek to
use broadcasting, despite the cartel's power to force such change.
How these documents are used — or not used — is the subject of
an essay in this volume by Mark Templeton.
Taking the market for loyalties approach seriously, broadcast
reform would look to countries that face similar problems in pre
serving (or modifying) the cartel and employ the tools found suc
cessful in those other places. Those in charge of the cartel of
loyalties would want to find devices to place the power of destabi
lizing images in what are deemed safe hands. Safe hands might be
local hands, corporate hands, or transnational hands; but the ques
tion would generally be whether those hands are as non-threaten
ing as possible.
The rhetoric of broadcasting reform is, almost by definition,
different from the substance of broadcasting reform, except in a
few limited instances. Few modern and democratic governments,
or participants in policy making, would articulate a policy of regu
latory reform saying explicitly that it was designed to keep theni in
power. An authoritarian society with a monopoly on information
and which represents itself as an authoritarian society might have
little difficulty marrying rhetoric to reality, ^eats to the monop
oly must be defeated, and making that explicit may be part of the
ideology of control.
25 See e.g., SUBCOMM. ON INT'L OPERATIONS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 102D
CONG., REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON U.S. GOVERNMENT INTERNATIONAL
BROADCASTING (Comm. Print 1992).
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In most modern societies, however, the elegant language of
democracy and openness must be observed even while pursuing
the restrictions and cartel-producing results that would be predict
able in most markets for loyalties. This is so for several reasons.
First, each era has its style and vocabulary in statutes as well as in
dress and modes of living. Ours is a style of openness, pluralism,
and freedom to receive and impart information. With very few na
tional exceptions, the style is used to the extent possible
in back
ground documents, speeches, findings, and prologues to statutes
where that technique is used. Second, the rhetoric or style of open
ness is, as indicated above, itself a tool of seeming inclusion.^^ This
is the Orwellian point: the political use of language to cover behav
ior that is its opposite. Finally, the substance of restriction may
ultimately be tested in the courts as well as in the court of public
opinion. The language of openness may be considered part of a
strategy to convince courts that an otherwise restrictive statute falls
within the norms of a constitution or international convention.
II.

INDIA, THE BROADCASTING BILL AND THE MARKET FOR
LOYALTIES

What are the implications of this approach for understanding
the Indian Broadcasting Bill? As various accounts in this volume
suggest, much of the history of broadcasting and the press in India
is consistent with the market for loyalties theory of broadcasting
regulation. The delay in introducing television, the delay in invest
ing in color television, the extremely close relationship between
Doordarshan and the Government, the delay in implementing
Prasar Bharati, the ban on uplinking, and the virtual prohibition of
private terrestrial broadcasters are all consistent with the notion of
control of the balance of the voices in the society.
Despite the invocation of Western models and precedents, the
implicit strategy of the Broadcasting Bill is to adopt those devices
available to restrict competition as well as those measures neces
sary for reasons of technology, public opinion, and constitutional
requirement to allow new entrants. Such a strategy, under a mar
ket for loyalties" analysis, is the outcome of rational behavior by
those in power seeking to maintain it. Such a strategy is necessarily
26 Some argue that freedom of expression and openness can even be seen as an ideol
ogy, used or abused by different groups in society. See, e.g., Fredrick Schauer, The First
Amendment As Ideology, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 853 (1992).
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antecedent to the search for statutory language (including statutory
models from abroad) that will enshrine the new arrangements. The
world's regulatory practices then present a tool kit which can be
examined for techniques and instruments that will together be
thought to bring about the desired result.
Given a definition of national identity based on a defense of
power by those in control, there are strong implications for any
media legislative reform, including the Indian Broadcasting Bill.
Those responsible (at the highest level) for drafting and adopting
broadcasting reform would introduce just such pieces of "reform"
legislation that perform the function desired. In the case of the
Broadcasting Bill, if an important function is posited as protecting
an existing cartel of loyalties against new challengers, then many of
the additions are readily explicable.
For example, one debated issue in the Indian Broadcasting
Bill concerned cross-media ownership. An important part of that
debate dealt with the expansion of the power of newspapers
through acquisition of television licenses. A cross-media owner
ship rule that curbed these newspapers could have been and was
framed in terms of frustrating monopolies. But the rule could also
be read as assuring some effort to support a status quo in the distri
bution of political power. Barred from ownership of television sta
tions, newspapers that represented a particular point of view or
segment of a coalition could not gain additional power. The issue
would be decided against a background in which there is question
whether newspapers have too much influence within parties and
whether the larger newspapers and the parties they represent, if
they expand, will break the balance of relationship with smaller
parties or other forces within the society.
The effect of provisions in the Bill on the internal balance of
political forces was augmented by the effect on that balance of
what might be called "external influences." Here the licensing of
DTK providers and satellite channels comes into play. The critical
point is not the direct effect such television might have directly on
the young, but, in a stronger sense, the extent to which such televi
sion loosens the hold of the existing political hegemony. Foreign
signals — or foreign content — may be thought to break down
loyalties to significant aspects of the existing power structure.
Some groups might object to foreign signals on principle, but
they might also realize that, for reasons relating to that principle,
over time images have power to wean people from their prior alle-
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giances. If this threat is deemed sufficiently grave it could lead to a
joint effort by otherwise squabbling internal forces who agree to
put aside their differences; whatever coalition exists internally
could be undone if the new television incorporates influences so
powerful that they shake most previously conceivable iterations of
the status quo.
It is quite easy, then, to look again at the 1997 Indian Broad
casting Bill in the light of this analysis. The most potent threats to
the existing cartel, the dominant voice of those in power, are said
to be the foreign satellite television broadcasting services. While
most of the rhetoric has been about this source of challenge, the
Bill is more comprehensive. Because newly issued terrestrial tele
vision licenses could be extremely potent challengers as well, they
might have more immediate access to homes than those dependent
on cable television with its monthly and additional charges and
may represent indigenous political forces that have obvious and
passionate, information-hungry constituencies. Similarly, cable tel
evision could be a threat if it were organized such that cable opera
tors had wide choice as to what should appear on the television
screen. All of these are subject to regulation and control as to
entry.
The Broadcasting Bill, whether purposely or not, seems
designed to deal with influences that could be seen as hegemonythreatening institutions. Television licenses would be granted by a
broadcasting authority so composed that it is itself a reflection of
the hegemony and certain to be sensitive to its needs. The foreign
equity prohibition is another reflection of this attention to the spe
cial power of terrestrial broadcasting licenses. Cable television is
not only subject to a license itself, but all programming on its chan
nels can be taken only from licensed sources. And the cultural in
vaders are dealt with through the uplinking requirement and the
foreign equity caps. Cross-media ownership prohibitions and re
strictions on the number of licenses can be read as establishing
legal barriers to the accumulation of significant media power by a
dissident to challenge effectively the dominant voice of Doordarshan and other participants in the hegemony.
But the legislation not only restricts, it expands the number of
voices, altering or legitimating the existing alteration of a previous
status quo. Is such an expansion consistent with the "market for
loyalties" theory? The answer lies in how the law determines who
is a favored entrant and why. Law, here, can only act as an indica-

458

CARDOZO J. OF INT'L & COMF. LAW

[Vol. 5:445

tor of intention; the actual administration of the law will determine
how the expansion takes place. The Broadcasting Bill, for example,
somewhat controversially excludes religious organizations from
gaining ownership of a terrestrial license, perhaps because of a fear
that the power of television and the power of religion, together, too
considerably facilitates the development of an uncontrollable and
effective base of challenge.
It is here, too, where the composition of the regulatory author
ity becomes important, as it is in all societies. The chapter in this
volume by Professor Prosser underscores this point. There is rarely
anything like complete "autonomy" in such agencies charged with
issuing licenses and determining whether the terms of such licenses
are being met. But in terms of fidelity to the "market of loyalties"
analysis, it is important to determine how controlled and how sub
ject to the influence of the governing structure the authority might
be.
Virtually no law can wholly exclude programming from
abroad. As S. Jaipal Reddy, the Minister of Information and
Broadcasting, has said, India will not be King Canute, seeking to
hold back the waves. The incapacity to exclude, however, means
finding a way to legitimate and, at the same time, limit an opening
that has the inherent capacity to control. The proposed Broadcast
ing Bill accomplished this in several ways. The primary method
was to require uplinking within India for signals that would be di
rected to an Indian audience (either through cable, direct broad
cast, or DTH delivery). Unabashedly, this was thought to be a
necessary element of control, an opportunity to have a physical ca
pacity to block, censor, or discipline an entity involved m program
ming that was considered forbidden.
How does DTH satellite delivery of television channels figure
in this under the Broadcasting Bill? Foreign ownership aside,
DTH is often deemed to provide the greatest challenge to the ex
isting cartel in the market for loyalties. It appears beyond reach
though it may not be. It appears to be outside the tradition of legal
controls over physical matter, though, again, that may be solely be
cause of undue apprehension. Since it would be inconsistent with
the desirability of the new rhetoric to exclude DTH as a competi
tor, a second strategy would be to provide a mechanism m which
delay is a likelihood, or one in which the DTH system would go to
a favored provider along the lines of the Malaysian model in which
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MEASAT, with close ties to the Government, received a virtual
DTH monopoly.
The viability of a nation-state depends in part on its ability to
invent and nourish national traditions. India, at the time of the
Broadcasting Bill debate, was about to celebrate its fiftieth anni
versary of independence. However complex the nature of that cel
ebration, it would be immediately comprehended that weakening
Doordarshan was against the nation-building vein. In India, the
difficulties of nation building are linked to the history of broadcast
ing and are reflected in other essays in this volume. It was useful to
the nation if television provided or nourished new mythologies,
new leaders, new histories, or new narratives, and it would be use
ful if it could continue to do so. But processes of transformation
require central direction; that is why harnessing media in the pro
ject of change has always been a governmental objective in India as
well as elsewhere.
III.

THE INEVITABILITY OF COMPARATIVE MEDIA LAW

All this leaves the very difficult question of assessing the na
ture of broadcast reform in the comparative paradigm. Is media
law so country specific, so tied to the mores, history, political struc
ture, regulatory style, and state of the creative industry in a particu
lar place that influences from other contexts are only marginally
helpful? Or, on the contrary, is media law, especially in interna
tional societies, so much a part of an increasingly transnational
whole that any attempt at identifying sharp local differences,
unique in style and outcome, is virtually doomed? This essay has
been an effort to develop and apply a comprehensive theory — one
that has implications in each setting. There is, however, a related
mode of comparison: the actual importation of chunks of law from
one setting to another. The industry that exists in transferring me
dia law expertise from one place to another certainly claims to per
form a function far different from the one that we have so far been
discussing.
Thus far in this chapter, the emphasis has been on what we
learn from comparative media law analysis about the kinds of strat
egies that governments follow when they believe that the national
identity that has achieved a sufficient degree of political stability is
threatened. But this is not the whole story. Media law and policy
seem to be like a set of interchangeable machine parts; the ways
states deal with problems that are common to many or all of them.
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It is as if there is an inventory of applications; the task of the expert
is to identify a country or countries with a similar attitude toward
the degree of openness in speech, find the bit of law that deals with
the particular issue involved (e.g., cross-media ownership or con
trol of obscenity), and then help to retool or modify that bit for
adoption elsewhere.
In the post-Cold War world, this task of discovery and trans
ference has been institutionalized and, at least with respect to Cen
tral and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, financed by
supplier governments. The USAID in the US and the Know How
Fund in the UK are examples of this approach. Both have pro
vided grants or contracts to experts to help use national donor ex
pertise to assist in fashioning the media structures in the newly
independent or transitional states. Why is this the case? The ex
port of broadcasting systems from the West is deemed important
because of a deeply held belief that a democratic media under the
rule of law is central to the development of a democratic society. It
may also be an aspiration by the exporting country that the adop
tion of a particular style of system of legal regulation will result in
continued relations and the export of television product. In the
case of India, the process of providing technical assistance was not,
however, a function of foreign governments, nor did it need to be.
The Ministry itself and technicians of the Government engaged in
research to determine appropriate models abroad. In addition,
assistance on these questions have come from the multinational
broadcasters themselves, not well-meaning British or French or
American public agencies.
Just as there is a functional value to government proponents of
foreign models, the same is true for advocacy by private groups. To
be sure, transnational companies often cite those examples from
abroad that serve their purposes. But they also have a broad inter
est in consistent and well thought-out legislation of varied impact.
It is important, for example, for businesses that are transnational to
face government approaches in different national contexts that are
as similar as possible. Those companies that seek to do business
globally and want to program regionally desire, appropriately, to
have some common vocabulary, some common approaches in the
absence of a supranational authority. There is a stake in having
common language in statutes, and common philosophies in en
forcement. These transnational companies need predictability in
terms of investment and in terms of the consequences of program-
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ming decisions. Overlap, consistency, the evolution of common
forms of regulation — all of these lead to efficient and, perhaps,
better products.
Foreign models can, of course, provide standards which are,
though non-binding, influential assessments of what responsible of
ficials elsewhere, presented with similar problems, have done. As
has been indicated, one of the principal examples of the invocation
of foreign law as a model in the Indian Broadcasting Bill debate
was the decision of the Supreme Court of India in Ministry of In
formation & Broadcasting v. Cricket Ass'n of Bengal in 1995.^^ Not
only did the decision purport to rely very strongly on American
and European precedents, but the documents surrounding the
presentation of the Broadcasting Bill, which repeatedly cited these
precedents as if they were influential, perhaps compelling, had
been absorbed by the policy makers rather than merely reiterated.
Justice S. Jaipal Reddy's opinion dealt with the exploration in Eu
ropean and American jurisprudence of the rights of viewers and
listeners as opposed, as it were, to the rights of broadcasters. He
was relying on interpretations of human rights and constitutional
provisions from abroad not because they were binding, but because
they provided insight from highly respected individuals who held
positions similar to his own, dealing with fundamental documents
much like article 19 of the Constitution of India. Where there was
a consensus among interpreters, and where that consensus has
gained added sanction from being incorporated into international
documents, they were found to be influential.
Justice Reddy used the Hero Cup case to rethink article 19
doctrine, to use modes of analysis that had arisen elsewhere, and to
determine whether it should be used in the interpretation of the
Constitution of India. This was a great and creative use of foreign
models: not mechanically, not to further a particular private or car
tel view, but rather, in a reasoned way, to determine an alternate
idea of speech and the role of government. Justice Reddy's Hero
Cup opinion emphasized that Parliament and the Government
were mandated by the Constitution to restructure Doordarshan
and AIR so that they would be under an autonomous public au
thority — roughly the result of the then-shelved Prasar Bharati law
— and also to have a form of media architecture that permitted
independent competition with the government outlets.
27 Secretary, Ministry of Info. & Broad, v. Cricket Ass'n of Bengal (1995) 2 S.C.C. 161.
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These are all considerations — strategic, modular, analytic —
which seem to militate in favor of the extensive use of comparative
models. Yet, without question, some aspects of media law are spe
cifically local and tied deeply to their context. In India, concerns
about religion and media are very different from those in the US or
Europe. It is not possible to take media-related rulings that stem
from the Establishment Clause of the American Constitution and
import them, uncritically, into the Indian (or other) setting. Lan
guage, too, has extraordinary variables that are so tied to social
structure that media rules concerning them have to be dealt with
carefully. The Canadian approach, for example, to the decentrali
zation of language rules, and the policies which govern language
use in broadcasting, can be influential; but powerful cultural, social,
and political differences need to be taken into account.
There are ways, moreover, in which the complexities, technical
details, and the very structure of media laws arise out of a specific
tradition. In the US, there is a complicated relationship between
rules, licensing, and sanctions for the violation of rules. When the
fairness doctrine existed and was in full force, for example, it was
not enough to know the content of the doctrine; its true meaning
could only be understood by knowing when and whether the FCC
enforced it, how much of a sanction would be imposed, and
whether violation of the doctrine would be relevant at the time of a
license renewal. The fact that renewals are now almost automatic,
itself, would change the dynamic of a rule's meaning. Thus, at
times, societies that enforce a rule readily and harshly (say, closing
down a newspaper for violation of a rule against obscenity) con
sider that they are adopting a standard that exists in another place.
But rules come conditioned with an entire cohort of conditions,
assumptions, and rules for enforcement. A true adoption does not
take place — and maybe never can take place — without bringing
the surrounds along with the actual rule.
One other point should be made. No matter what is actually
said, however deferential or absorbing a society seems to be to
models from abroad, the greatest source for law is internal to the
country. Even in the most difficult transitions — those from the
authoritarian Soviet regimes to the democratic democracies —
what went before was highly relevant to what went after. Lan
guage, mode of thinking, and regulatory perspectives are ingrained
and inherent. Even where models are specifically adopted — say,
the model of the BBC for an autonomy of public service television
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— old habits of relationships between governments and bureaucra
cies cannot easily be avoided. In the Indian Broadcasting Bill, and
in Prasar Bharati, not only the years of independence, but the years
of colonial administration provide a backdrop to the design and
implementation of the regulatory authority. The chapters of Sevanti Ninan and Nikhil Sinha underscore this point.
What is fairly clear, however, is that in a period of globaliza
tion, when technology and the changes that technology mandates
have so substantial an impact on practices around the world, com
parative approaches become essential. The impetus for knowledge
about another country's practices in media regulation becomes al
most as important as knowing generally about another country's
practices in trade. Regional approaches to media imagery, the im
pact of multilateral agreements and investments on media prac
tices, and the very requirements of those participating in the
market all require a process of borrowing or coordination. It is in
that sense that comparative law studies become inevitable. The
only question is how thoroughly they are conducted and how the
complex aspects of the context in which media laws are embedded
are understood.
IV. CONCLUSION
Lurking behind all of these issues relating to the use of com
parative models is another more difficult question: whether tech
nology — especially transborder technology like satellite and the
Internet — intrinsically confounds and resists law, making law a
negotiation between state and supplier rather than an order from
government to citizen. This question is frequently posed in terms
of whether or not there is some degree of technological determin
ism that makes legal reforms that are not sensitive to them virtually
irrelevant. On the Internet, this question has arisen in the context
of regulating obscenity or defamation and also adopting a regime
that would assure that the copyrights or intellectual property rights
of authors and programmers are properly recognized and that com
pensation for those rights is efficiently enforceable. Already in the
US, the Supreme Court has struck down — though not on the un
principled grounds of technological determinism — congressional
efforts to regulate the Internet to prohibit certain "indecent pro
gramming" directed to or available to the young. Vagueness, the
availability of alternatives, and, in some sense, the very spirit (this
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resistance to law) of the Internet frustrate the imposition of certain
legal standards.
Domesticating the Internet, which has had a regulation-free
and transnational beginning, is one of the obvious challenges or
threats and seems quite difficult.^® But the situation may be the
same for maintaining the domestication of broadcasting structures
that are increasingly like (if not converging with) the Internet sys
tem. Here, one may put aside the necessary aspects of regulatory
machinery, such as technical aspects of spectrum allocation or even
the mechanics of licensing. These aspects of law ordinarily follow
industrial precedents, often, in fact, incorporating agreements
among the affected businesses which are then enshrined into law.
But even those attributes of law that are deemed pertinent to a
particular evocation of national identity — regulation of foreign
investment, quotas, content norms, and other aspects of law which
affect the distribution of television, its availability and cost to large
numbers of citizens — are increasingly beyond national power.
These laws that seem exceedingly important to a culture may be
hard to shape and harder to enforce. It is these provisions that are
often invoked by reference to other laws, but where the very avail
ability of law in a global society is most questionable.
Throughout the enterprise, dealing both with the new technol
ogies and the old, not only the translation of words, or even of
concepts, but the translation of deeply engaged settings and toe
machinery of administration must be taken into account. The
words of article 19 of the Constitution of India or the First Amend
ment to the US Constitution, for example, are embedded m the
music of their context. For people working in this area, a senous
28 Some have suggested that in the case of the Internet, as an international phenome
non only a unique set of international treaties can effectively serve to regulate the new
services. This view overlooks, however, an important part of the namre of the interna
tional community. The international community can agree and act quite decisively where
there is a common consensus about values to be protected and the means necessary o
protect them. Sec, e.g., Concerning Problems of Criminal
Information Technology, Recommendation No. R(95)13 (visited Oct. 10, 199p
p.
www.privacy.org/pi/intLorgs/coe/info_tech_1995.html> (representing a regiona multilat
eral effort by the Council of Europe to increase levels of cooperation m myestigation of
computer rules). Likewise, the international community becomes powerless to effect
change where such consensus does not exist or breaks down as a consequence of differe
cultural sensitivities (e.g., the regulation of poUtical speech, obscenity, etc.). M^eoven m
some countries the concern is more cultural and especially Unguistic: there are fears a^ut
English language-dominated information services. The same can be said m the case of
transnational approaches to regulate broadcasting.
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problem involves the portability of these magic constitutional
words or their continental equivalents. It is sometimes difficult for
those from Washington or Boston who market the First Amend
ment in Kiev, Kuala Lumpur, Bangkok, or Budapest to understand
or translate the complexities of its adaptation. One cannot talk of
"judges," of "neutral principles," or of "accountability of govern
ment officials to a rule of law" without sensitivity to the differences
that may unravel the hidden meanings of these terms.
Even sophisticated experts, schooled in the relativism of an
thropology and sociology, find it hard to sort out the comparative
aspects of all these questions and to help determine what element
from the bundle of historically enacted statutes should be adapted
to what context. It is easier to conclude that laws and institutions
come in ready-made, almost modular packages, such as model stat
utes or constitutions. Various units for archiving and evaluative
analysis automatically come to mind. These include the persistence
of a monopoly in state television, the existence of prior censorship
of the press, arbitrariness and corruption in frequency allocation,
and recognition of the rights of journalists. Examination of the for
mal framework can also focus on depoliticizing the appointment of
chief executive officers of public service broadcasters, broadening
the composition and appointment of supervisory or regulatory
bodies, and applying the rule of law to the decisions of government
agencies.
The post-modern, post-critical, post-legal realist is more than a
naturalist working with cabinets stuffed with statutes, pinned like
butterflies under glass. To examine change formally, there is the
project of chronicling specific statutory drafts and laws, country by
country, organizing them by category, and engaging in a textual
analysis comparing proposed and achieved transformations in one
state to those in another. But far more is necessary, far more un
derstanding, far more in terms of context, far more in terms of
matching the legal equivalents of modern technology to the situa
tion at hand.

